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Civil engineers are everyday faced with multidisciplinary problems. Their tasks are not only related to technical aspects, but also 
involve ethical and environmental issues, economic considerations and, nowadays, international collaborations. This broad spectrum 
of aspects requires a strong technical knowledge, as well as many interpersonal skills and an interest in societal related issues. When 
traditional courses are simply adapted to the development of technical competences, introducing students to non-technical (although 
civil engineering-related) aspects remains a challenge. To remediate to this difficulty, an innovative approach was implemented in the 
undergraduate course of Soil Mechanics at Polytechnique Montreal. The originality of our approach relies on the study of failure case 
studies from a forensic point of view and on the challenge of students with real world multidisciplinary applications. Students are thus 
entirely involved in the case study and act as investigators recruited to find the cause of a failure and its impact on social and 
environmental issues. This methodology prevents student passivity and the role of the professor is only to guide students towards a 
holistic understanding of the events, rather than suggesting solutions for them. The paper will present the overall course design and 





Civil engineering is not limited to the construction or the 
design of buildings, but is a multidisciplinary domain 
involving technical aspects, project management and human 
considerations. As a consequence, civil engineer students have 
not only to receive a strong technical formation, but also to be 
sensitized to non-technical aspects of engineering.  
 
To address all multidisciplinary aspects, Polytechnique 
Montreal uses a curriculum composed of a strong technical 
base ranging from geotechnical to structural engineering and 
some parallel courses, such as ethics or economy. 
Nevertheless, a link has to be done between non-engineering 
and engineering topics to introduce students to project 
management, which represents a challenge composed of a 
variety of problems. To this end, team projects have been 
introduced in curriculums at Polytechnique Montreal to place 
the students in a situation of management, where they have to 
refer to different domains to find technical and economical 
solutions to a pre-defined problem. This situation could be 
seen as a top-down relation, from the management to the 
technic or from the need to the solution. On the reverse angle, 
we tried to input a new approach in the course of soil 
mechanics by putting the students in a technical situation and 
asking them to go backward to the constraints of management, 
economy or human relations. 
 
This new approach relies on the use of case studies as a 
support of motivation and concrete student training. Indeed, 
Raju and Sanker (1999) demonstrated the importance of using 
case studies in engineering education to expose students to 
real-world issues and case studies have also been linked to the 
increase of student motivation and interest in a subject 
(Mustoe and Croft, 1999). 
 
The use of case studies is opposed to traditional classrooms 
where artificial problems are created to apply a new notion 
such as a structural or a geotechnical theory. As the use of 
artificial problems reinforces the viewpoint that projects are a 
collection of individual problems such as schedules, structural 
concepts, or environmental hazards (Chinowsky and al., 
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1997), we decided to base our approach on a case study 
presented within lectures all along the semester. The use of a 
recurrent case study during the semester illustrates the 
complexity of engineering problems. It is opposed to single-
focus case studies that fail to highlight the numerous 
interdisciplinary forces and can therefore give an inadequate 
understanding of the civil engineering profession to the 
students (Chinowsky and al., 1997). 
 
The originality of this article relies on the preparation of the 
case study to match the course of soil mechanics during the 
whole semester. Some aspects of the case study are presenting 
to illustrate a typical intervention in a lecture and the way to 
link technical considerations to non-technical constraints. 
 
 
COURSE OF SOIL MECHANICS 
 
The curriculum of civil engineer students is composed of 
4 years and the course of soil mechanics appears in the third 
one, just before specialty orientations such as building and 
civil engineering structures, environment, transportation, 
geotechnical engineering and applied hydraulics. 
 
 
Course in the curriculum 
 
This course is mandatory for students in the civil engineer 
curriculum and is preceded by the material’s resistance course, 
which is a prerequisite. Indeed, students need to have some 
good notions of stress, deformation, stress-deformation 
relation, tensile, compressive and shear strength, principal 
stresses, and Mohr’s circles to succeed in this course. 
 
Without being a formal prerequisite, the course of general 
geology represents an asset for the comprehension of the 
formation of soils and the mineralogy of clays. 
 
Although it comes quite lately in the curriculum, the course of 
soil mechanics constitutes an introduction to geotechnical 
engineering and the attraction of students to this field of 
engineering represents a challenge. Indeed, most of them have 
been interested by the first courses in the curriculum and have 
already chosen their orientation. As a consequence, many 
students chose deliberately another specialty, even though 
they find the initiation to geotechnical engineering very useful. 
Even if the position of this course is not appropriate to catch 
an early on attention of students, it would be difficult to 
modify the curriculum. Indeed, students have to know how to 
design a building and how to calculate the load lowering in 
order to design a foundation able to respond to these 
constraints.  
 
The second challenge of this course is to attract students for 






The course is composed of twelve three hour long lectures, 
7 laboratories and 12 recitation classes. The Table 1 presents 
the themes studied along the semester.  
 
Table 1: Planning of the soil mechanics lectures 
 
1 
Description and classification of soils (I): physical 
indexes, phase relations, grain size curve. 
2 
Description and classification of soils (II): 
Atterberg’s limits, classification. 
3 
Description and classification of soils (III): clayey 
minerals, structure of soils 
Compaction: theory, material and method, 
specifications and control. 
4 
Stresses in soils: total and effective stresses, vertical 
and horizontal stresses. 
5 
Water in soils (I): capillarity, shrinking, swelling, 
frozen soils. 
6 
Water in soils (II): permeability, hydraulic head, 
Darcy’s law, one-dimensional flow, quicksand. 
7 Water in soils (III): flow nets, filters. 
8 Consolidation and settlement. 
9 Rate of consolidation. 
10 
Mohr’s circles and theory of rupture : 
- Transformation of constraints, 
- Mohr-Coulomb criteria, 
- Direct shear test, 
- Triaxial test principle (CD, CU, UU). 
11 
Shear strength of non-cohesive  
and cohesive soils:  
- Behavior of sands in CD and CU triaxial tests, 
- total and effective stresses analyses, 
- behavior of clays in CD, CU and UU triaxial tests. 





This course represents an initiation to geotechnical 
engineering. As such, it does not intend to form students able 
to design a retaining wall, an earth dam or a deep foundation, 
but aims to give them a strong knowledge related to 
mechanical and hydraulic behaviors of soils. This common 
minimum represents a prerequisite for their future courses, 
such as foundations, excavations, dikes and earth dams, and 
road infrastructures. At the end of this course, the students are 
able to: 
 classify the soils based on their composition and their 
behavior, 
 analyse the phase relations of a soil element, 
 select laboratory tests to respond to a given geotechnical 
problem, 
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 analyse the results of basics laboratory tests 
 describe the theory of compaction of soils 
 describe the effects of water on the behavior of different 
soils, 
 evaluate the groundwater flows by analytical methods, 
 draw a flow net under a dam or a foundation, 
 calculate the total and effective stresses in a soil, 
 analyse the compression of a soil layer, 
 calculate the degree of consolidation of a clay, 




CASE STUDY PRINCIPLE 
 
To reinforce the attraction of this course, a new planning 
relying on a case study has been introduced since 
August 2012. The idea of this new approach is to present a 
real problem of engineering to initiate the students to non-
technical constraints. This approach intends to sensitive the 
students to the job that they will exercise all along their career 
and, at a smaller term, to catch their attention for the rest of 
the curriculum. Ethical considerations such as safety and 
security also constitute an important aspect introduced in the 
course. 
 
As previously mentioned, the case study is used throughout 
the semester and we refer to it each week. This case study is 
used as a support for the discovery of new concepts by the 
students and aims to apply the theory immediately. References 
to the case are done at the end of lectures, during a 10 to 15 
min presentation. Among the 12 lectures, 10 contain 
references to the case study as presented in Table 1. A 
reference to the case study represents the illustration of each 
main chapter in the planning. 
 
Studying a case presents some benefits as an interactive 
learning strategy, shifting the emphasis from teacher-centered 
to more student-centered activities (Grant, 1997), and active 
learning activities such as small group reflection before 
sharing with the class are also used to reinforce this 
interaction. 
 
The scheme of each reference to the case study is as follows: 
 Brief links to the lecture to highlight  the main points 
of the course, 
 Presentation of an element related to the case study: 
particular design, choice of materials, geology, 
hydraulic… 
 Problematic or question related to this element: why a 
particular design has been retained? What is the 
impact of the geology on the project? Could we have 
chosen other materials for the construction of the 
project? 
 Reflection in small groups (3 to 4 people) 
 Answers and synthesis with whole classroom. 
 
 
Case study preparation 
 
Preparation of the case study and lectures had to be done 
simultaneously to insure a complementary cohesion between 
the concepts learned in class and a portion of the case study. 
 
During the summer of 2012, this course received funds from 
the Center for teaching and learning to improve its course 
notes. This fund was dedicated to the recruitment of two 
students who had passed brilliantly the course and who 
worked to prepare the notes for the case study. The 
implication of previous students, able to take a step back in 
relation to the course was very important. 
 
Their summer internship was divided into three parts: 
- Bibliographic study related to the case (reports from 
experts, papers…), 
- Research related to case studies in teaching, 
- Preparation of a PowerPoint support for each 
presentation of the case. 
 
 
Case study selection 
 
To select the case study, we had to deal with several 
constraints. The case study has to be important enough to 
cover all the matter learned in classes. On the contrary, the 
notions presented in the case must stay at a basic level as the 
course is just an introduction to geotechnical engineering. 
Finally, the case study has to cover non-technical aspects, such 
as economics, human relations… 
 
To sensitize students to the responsibility of engineers, we 
decided to choose a case of failure and our attention had been 
pointed to the Teton Dam failure, in 1976. This choice is 
justified by: 
 the multitude of documentation related to this dam: 
reports from experts after the failure, papers, pictures, 
videos… 
 the relative simplicity of the design for a young 
geotechnical engineer: earth dam involving soil 
compaction, no deep foundation, except a cut-off 
wall… 
 the implication of economy via the choices done 
during the construction and the damages resulting 
from the failure. 
 
 
TETON DAM CASE STUDY 
 
Teton dam is unfortunately known as the highest embankment 





As illustrated on Fig. 1, Teton Dam was located in the south-
east of Idaho, approximately 64 km northeast of Idaho Falls. 
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This dam was designed for multipurpose, such as flood 
control, power generation, recreation, fish and wildlife 
mitigation measures, and irrigation of 110,000 acres in the 
Fremont-Madison Irrigation District (Schuster and Embree, 
1980).  This earth fill dam had a maximum height of 122 m, 
was 940 m long and was supporting a reservoir whose 
capacity was 333 Mm
3
. It was constructed under the 
supervision of the US Bureau of Reclamation and the 
construction was attributed to the consortium Morrison-
Knudsen-Kiewit. Fieldwork started in June 1972 and the first 
filling up started in October 3
rd
, 1975. Unfortunately, the 








 of water and 3 Mm
3
 of materials 
were spread in the river in about 6 hours (Lloyd and Watt, 
1981). The downstream destruction zone was very important 
and reached the upper end of American Falls Reservoir, 
located 95 miles from the dam. The maximum flowrate was 
estimated at 28 300 m
3
/sec and was the source of deaths, 
inundation and destruction. 
 
This failure resulted in the death of 14 people and created an 
unparalleled event in the history of Reclamation.  Even though 
legal experts stated that the Federal Government was not liable 
for the flood damage, the Administration pointed out that the 
United States had a moral obligation, and a special mention 
was adopted to pay for damages. Thus, a compensation 
slightly less than 400 million US$ was paid to claimants and 
contractors who repaired the flood-damaged infrastructures. 
 
After the failure, two independent groups were constituted to 
investigate the failure: the Independent Panel (IP) and the 
Interior Review Group (IRG). The IP was composed of nine 
internationally recognized engineers, while the IRG was 
composed of representatives from five Federal agencies 
concerned with dam construction. Three reports were 








Teton Dam was located in the Teton River canyon, whose 
geologic area is bounded by the Rocky Mountain and the 
Snake River Plain. The major geologic activities in the area 
are the uplift of the Teton and Snake River and the associated 
volcanic activity from Island Park and Yellowstone area 
(Randle and al., 2000). During the late Pliocene and early 
Pleistocene age, a flow of rhyolite coming from Yellowstone 
Caldera was deposited over a pre-existing irregular landscape 
and formed the Huckleberry Ridge tuff , a 70 to 200-meters-
thick formation (Pierce and Morgan, 1992). 
 
The Teton River has cut a volcanic plateau, known as the 
Rexburg Bench, resulting in a steep-walled canyon. The 
canyon walls were composed of welded ash-flow tuff of 
rhyolite. The north wall was very steep or vertical, and the 
south wall was less steep and composed of a poorly sorted 
mixture of talus, colluvium, and loess coming from the plateau 
(Randle and al., 2000). Some alluvium had been deposited in 
the river channel to a depth of about 30 m (Sasiharan, 2003). 
A cross-section of the canyon is provided in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2 : Cross section of the Teton River 
 
As for all construction projects, extensive site exploration was 
performed prior to construction. Percolation tests and pumping 
tests revealed that the joints in the rhyolite-tuff were able to 
transmit up to 380 l/min. These results demonstrated that the 
extensive joint system was extremely permeable and needed to 
be sealed to reduce the leakage to acceptable quantities. 
Nevertheless, some pilot tests demonstrated that it would have 
needed huge quantities of grout and that it would be more 
economical to remove the top 23 m of rock and incorporate a 
deep key trench to prevent seepage (Sasiharan, 2003). 
 
It is finally important to mention that the high lands are 
covered with loess in the area of the Teton River. The 
thickness of this aeolian silt deposit can reach 9 m, which 
represents a great quantity of material leading engineers to use 
it the core of the dam.  
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Reservoir filling and failure 
 
Reservoir filling began in November 1975 and the water level 
started to rise rapidly during the spring of 1976. According to 
the design of the reservoir, the filling rate was expected to be 
less than 30 cm per day, but an abnormal spring run-off and 
some delays for the completion of the works resulted in a 
higher filling rate reaching 120 cm per day during May 1976. 
By June 5
th
, 1976, the water level was only one meter below 
the spillway crest and 9 m below the embankment crest. 
 
Abnormal observations were done two days before the failure, 
when some small springs were observed at the riverbed level 
about 450 m downstream from the embankment. On June 4
th
, 
some additional springs had developed about 120 m from the 
downstream toe, but an immediate inspection of the upstream 
and downstream slopes of the embankment showed no 
unusual condition. After these first observations, the failure 
took place as follow: 
 at 7h00 a.m. on June 5th, some water was flowing 
from the downstream face of the embankment, about 
40 m below the crest of the dam (see Fig. 3). The 
flow was about 56 l/s; 
 at the same time, a flow of about 700 l/s emerged 
from the talus, near the toe of the embankment; 
 during the next three hours, the flow from the 
downstream face increased progressively up to 
425 l/s at about 10h30 a.m.; 
 after this time, the seepage increased rapidly 
accompanied by progressive upward erosion 
(see Fig. 4) and the complete failure occurred at 
11h55 a.m. (see Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 3 : initiation of the failure 
 
 
Fig. 4 : progressive upward erosion 
 
Fig. 5 : Failure of the Teton Dam 
Photography credit : Arthur G. Sylvestre 
 
 
Investigations by the independent panel (IP 1976) 
 
According to the Independent Panel, two mechanisms were 
most likely to have led to the failure. The first hypothesis was 
related to seepage under the grout cap in unsealed joints of the 
rock. This phenomenon would have led to erosion along the 
base of the trench resulting in a piping failure through the key 
trench fill. Some investigation tests revealed the presence of 
non-sealed joints beneath the grout cap, reinforcing this 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, no leaks were observed prior the 
failure as it should had occurred if the phenomenon had 
contributed to the failure. 
 
The second hypothesis was related to hydraulic fracturing or 
differential settlement resulting in a piping failure. Fracturing 
tests and finite element analysis concluded that the stress 
distribution could have led to hydraulic fracturing in the core 
due to high water pressure upstream. Nevertheless, their 
experimentation to generate hydraulic fractures in the field did 
not succeed. 
 
The IP concluded that although they described two main 
mechanisms for the initiation of failure, it was impossible to 




Investigations of the interior review group (IRG 1977) 
 
The first conclusions of IRG’s report stated that the Teton 
Dam was constructed as specified and failed as a result of 
inadequate protection of the impervious core from internal 
erosion. The cracking of the core material was pointed out as 
the most probable mode of failure, but interface erosion at the 
contact between the core and the rock was mention as another 
probable mode.  
 
However, the IRG recommended additional investigations 
which consisted in testing the grouting conditions, excavating 
the left part of the dam and performing finite element analysis 
to support the study with relevant parameters. Some of these 
further investigations will be present later in this article, as a 
part of the case study presented to the students.  
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USE OF THE TETON DAM CASE STUDY IN THE 
COURSE 
 
The detail of the case study presentations is provided in 
Table 2. As explained earlier, each presentation has to be 
linked to the lecture and the themes are imposed by the course 
outline. Two case study presentations are detailed in the next 
paragraph as an illustration of the teaching approach. 
 
Table 2: Planning of the case study presentations 
 
Theme of the lecture Case study 
Description and 
classification of soils (I) 




classification of soils (II). 
 Classification of the dam’s 
materials: core, faces, 
 Problem of Loess chosen 
for the core, 
 Atterberg’s limits for the 
core 
Description and 
classification of soils (III) 
 
Compaction 
 Optimum Proctor curves 
used for the design of the 
dam. 
 Method of compaction of 
the core. 
Stresses in soils 
 Influence of water on the 
mechanical behavior of 
Loess. 
Water in soils (I)  Stresses in the core. 
Water in soils (II) 
 Treatment of the dam’s 
foundation (waterproofing) 
Water in soils (III) 




 Effect of first filling up on 
the deformation of the 
dam. Rate of consolidation. 
Mohr’s circles and theory 
of rupture. 
 Dam’s behavior in case of 
quick drawdown. 
Shear strength of non-
cohesive and cohesive 
soils. 
 Slope stability (dam and 
canyon located upstream). 
Synthesis: key elements  Case synthesis 
 
Classification of soils 
 
The presentation of the different materials involved in the dam 
is a very good application of the Unified Soil Classification 
System. Indeed, the dam contains five different zones with 
five types of soils, from clayey silts to rocks as illustrated on 
the simplified cross section provided on Fig. 6.   
 
 
Fig. 6 : Schematic cross-section of Teton Dam 
 
With respect to the multitude of post-failure investigations, a 
huge data bank related to the characterization of the soils was 
available. As a consequence, we could easily give some 
classification indexes to the students and ask them to classify 
the soils in each zone. This first application was a good 
opportunity to sensitize the student to the function of each 
zone, such as: 
- fine material in the core to ensure its function of 
impermeability, 
- well graded material disposed immediately against 
the core to ensure its function of filtration and to 
prevent any erosion, 
- coarse material at the extremity to prevent the action 
of water and precipitation. 
 
The focus of this presentation was pointed to the material that 
played an important role during the failure: the core of the 
dam. Given its grain size curve whose percentage passing 
under mesh 200 was approximately 88%, the students easily 
determined that it was a silt and clay. Given the results of the 
Casagrande liquid limit test device (27%) and the plasticity 
limit equal to 23%, the students deduced that the plasticity 
index was about 4% and that the soil was classified as a CL-
ML, that is to say some clays and silts with low plasticity. 
This finding closed the first step of direct application of the 
course and, given this result of classification, the first question 
was: according to the course that has just been presented, can 
you explain what would be the influence of water on the 
mechanical behavior of this soil? After a long blank, some 
questions or remarks came from the class: 
- we just have two results related to Casagrande’s 
device and plasticity manipulations. How can we 
quantify the influence of water on this soil? 
- no indications related to the behavior of the soil with 
respect to water are given … 
- don’t we need any additional information related to 
mechanical tests? 
 
These remarks pointed out that the students had listen to the 
course, but did not assimilate the notions of plasticity and 
liquidity limits. When reminding that the behavior of a soil is 
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“solid” when the water constant is under the plasticity limit 
and “semi-liquid” while it remains above the liquidity limit, 
the students did the link between the mechanical behavior of a 
soil and its water content. The expected response came 
immediately after this reminding and a student explained to 
the others that a change of only 4% in the water content can 
change the behavior of the soil, from solid to liquid. Finally, 
they realized that the 4% only represents 40L of water for 
1000 kg of dry soil! This illustrate clearly that the definition of 
plastic and liquid limit did not means anything without an 
actual example. The manipulation of numbers instead of 
symbols helped to assimilate the physical signification of the 
definitions introduced in the course. This application done, we 
continued the case study by presenting in detail the material 
chosen for the core and finally address non-technical 
constraints. 
 
This core has been realized with loess, which are aeolian 
materials transported in periglacial conditions and deposited in 
cold steppe, mainly around the 50° N parallel to the northern 
hemisphere, even if there is also some deposits in South 
America (Muñoz-Castelblanco, 2011). The typical process of 
formation of loess is as follow: 
1. Fine particles produced by glacial abrasion are 
washed, transported by proglacial flows and 
deposited near existing moraine. 
2. Particles of sand, silt and clay are subject to cycles of 
freezing and thawing. They are eroded and 
transported by the continuous action of cold and dry 
winds. These winds are created by existing high 
pressure over the polar ice caps. 
3. Sand particles, larger and heavier, are deposited first 
in the form of dunes and superficial layers. 
4. Particles of silt and clay are transported to areas of 
low pressure in high atmosphere. Finally, these fine 
particles are deposited due to several factors: climate 
change, decrease of the wind speed, presence of 
obstacles, captured by the vegetation or snow cover 
(Antoine, 2002). 
 
Loess are mainly composed of silt-sized particles of about 5 to 
80 microns and an important fraction of clay. They generally 
have the following characteristics (Smalley, 1971; Jamagne 
and al., 1981; Lautridou, 1985; Pécsi, 1990): 
 homogeneous structure and porous, 
 absence of stratification, 
 abundance of particles of about 30 mm silt, clay (15-
18%), and sand (<2%), 
 presence of carbonates, 
 predominance of minerals such as quartz grains (⋍ 
70%), iron (1.5 - 2%) and organic carbon (0.2%). 
 
In the case of the Teton dam, the loess have been derived from 
the Rocky Mountains and carried into the Idaho by the Snake 
River. The volume of 3 965 466 m
3
 necessary for the 
realization of the core has been taken in the area of the dam. 
 
As regards their mechanical behavior, the loess have a very 
low plasticity and are fragile and dilatant, meaning that they 
are easily erodible (formation of channels) and that they can 
loss their waterproofing function. 
 
This presentation done, the forensic question to the students 
was: with respect to their poor mechanical characteristics, 
why did the engineers choose the loess for the realization of 
the core? Here started a discussion about the incompetence of 
engineers, the irresponsibility of people involved in this 
project or the lack of knowledge at that time. Finally, a student 
guessed that this soil was the cheapest for the core. After 
investigation, they realized that the transportation of the soil 
represents a major element of the cost of an earth dam and that 
the volume of 3 965 466 m
3
 represent approximately 
2 203 036 T of soil and, if we consider a load of 15T per truck, 
146 869 trucks, that should be multiplied by the number of 
kilometers done by each truck… a good reason to explain the 
choice of local material for the realization of the core and to 
continue the discussion on the topic of ethics. Students finally 
realized that non-technical aspects can represent some severe 
constraints on a project, but that no concession should be done 





The second example deals with the compaction of the different 
zones. During the post-failure investigations, the embankment 
fill overlying the left abutment key trench was excavated for 
inspection. The Fig. 7 presents the dam nowadays, where we 
can see the zone of failure on the left of the picture and the 
zone of investigation on the right. This excavation was 
performed during the summer 1977 and did not revealed any 
findings of major significance, except a thin zone of soil with 
a very high water content encountered at a depth of 
approximately 66 m from the top of the dam. The discovery of 
this extensive wet seam on the left side of the embankment 
immediately led to the speculation that a similar seam could 
have generated the failure on the right of the embankment. 
Following the presentation of these investigations, the opinion 
of the students on the wet seam theory has been asked. Here 
started a succession of suppositions guided by new results of 
investigation given step by step to the students.  
 
 
Fig. 7 : Teton Dam nowadays 
Photography credit: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
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Firstly, the IRG report (1980) revealed that the location of the 
wet seam was essentially parallel and just above the winter 
shut-down surface (1974-1975). As a consequence, the 
forensic reflection of the students pointed out that this area 
was realized during the spring of 1975 and that the effect of 
frost action on the soil to explain the presence of the wet seam 
has to be discarded: a conclusion similar to the IRG report and 
a good opportunity to make a digression about the damages 
that could be performed by the frost action.  
 
The second element given to the students concerned the 
precipitations encountered during this period of construction. 
Indeed, there were two extended period of shut-down due to 
wet weather from April 29
th
 to May 29
th
, 1975, and snow or 









, 1975. This new information was immediately followed 
by interjection from several students referring to the course 
that they were just listening to. These students leaded the 
discussion and explained that this wet weather could have 
impact the compaction ration and the quality of the core: a 
direct application of the course…. 
 
Moreover, some indications regarding the control during the 
construction were given to the students. In particular, the daily 
reports revealed that the earthwork inspection staff did not 
reach its full capacity until May 12
th
, 1975, and that the 
frequency of the control tests was lower than required in May, 
1975. Once again, this element permitted a discussion about 
the responsibility of the engineers and the need of controls, 
which could have revealed the bad compaction of the wet 
seam zone. The hypothesis about the reason why the 
inspection staff did not reached its full capacity also lead to a 
discussion about human constraints in a project. 
 
Finally, the course was closed with expert’s conclusion about 
the eventual presence of a wet seam in the zone of failure. 
These experts concluded that it seems unlikely that a similar 
wet seam could have existed on the other side of the dam for 
the following reasons: 
 the elevation of the winter shut-down surface (1974-
1975) was higher in the zone of failure than in the 
zone investigated, 
 the wet seam observed in the investigated zone was 
placed during the period from May 1st to May 29th, 
1975, while the filling in the failure zone restarted 
only at May 29th. No anomaly was observed in the 
investigated zone placed after that date, and we can 
guess the same for the failure zone. 
 No evidence of any wet seam on the exposed face of 











The introduction of case studies in the curriculum of civil 
engineer students permits to illustrate non-technical aspects of 
a project. Study of failures such as Teton Dam is particularly 
interesting from an educational point of view because it 
unfortunately illustrates the implication of engineering 
activities. As a consequence, a failure reinforces the potential 
impact of economical, human or environmental constraints on 
a project and attends to inculcate responsibilities and ethics to 
these future engineers. 
 
Starting from a technical aspect presenting a default of 
conception, the students have to understand the reasons 
leading to an inappropriate choice of materials, design, 
methodology or control of the works. This approach stimulates 
self-reflection of students and reinforces their conception of 
responsibilities in their future profession. 
 
This methodology is presently testing in the course of soil 
mechanics at Polytechnique Montreal and future works related 
to this new approach will consist in an evaluation of the course 
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